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 The Endings of Early Medieval Kingdoms: 
Murder or Natural Causes?* 
by Julio Escalona
1. A short overview
Historians, archaeologists, and social scientists more generally, like to 
borrow and adapt terms from the physical and life sciences. Collapse is one 
such term. To which extent a word that evocates destruction and, ultimately, 
death can be applied to human societies has long been a matter of discussion. 
In the long run, the debate owes much to Gibbon’s catastrophic view of the 
ending of the Roman Empire, but the peaking interest of the last decades has 
a major reference in the ending of the Soviet Union, more recently coupled 
with global concerns about climate change and environmental catastrophe1. 
Such approaches are more readily found in discussions about very large and 
complex polities (empires) rather than smaller ones, and in fact it is empires 
and their aftermaths that are more frequently subjected to comparison2. 
The Early Middle Ages suffer no shortage of examples of large-scale pol-
* This text has been produced with support from the research project ref. HAR2013-47889-
C3-2-P, funded by the Spanish government’s Programa Estatal de Investigación Científica y 
Técnica de Excelencia. I would like to thank Dr. Iñaki Martín Viso, the convener of the Sala-
manca Symposium and editor of this special issue, for inviting me to participate in the sessions 
and then to write this text by way of conclusions. I am nonetheless indebted to all authors for 
sharing with me their research as well as for the many fascinating insights they provided during 
the Salamanca sessions. It is important to remark that this text contains my personal response 
to my reading of those essays. It does not purport to represent the authors’ ideas beyond the 
minimum needs of an intelligible discussion, and the points I make are not those of the individ-
ual authors. If I have somehow misunderstood or misrepresented any of them, that is naturally 
my sole responsibility.
1 For the first see for example Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; for the second, 
Diamond, Collapse. 
2 See for instance Empires. 
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ities in distress, be that the ending of the Roman Empire in the West, the 
fragmentation of the Umayyad Caliphate in the eighth century, that of the 
Carolingian Empire in the ninth, or any of the various episodes of crisis of the 
Byzantine empire. The number of lesser-scale political units that disappeared 
throughout the period is, of course, much larger. However, for various rea-
sons, medievalists have been less prone to re-frame their traditional narra-
tives about the ending of kingdoms and empires according to the conceptual 
toolkits that archeologists and anthropologists have been favouring over the 
last decades: “collapse”, “resilience”, “regeneration”, and so on. 
The papers gathered in this monographic section of «Reti Medievali. Ri-
vista» as the contributions to the Salamanca symposium they derive from, 
constitute an extremely interesting exercise in seeking shared perspectives 
to address issues that are usually considered within their own specific co-
ordinates, where exceptionality and uniqueness rule. Some authors indeed 
remark – as Insley does for Mercia – how much national historiographical 
traditions have shaped the way we think about lost kingdoms. By inserting 
them into a teleological narrative they become steps in the genealogy of pres-
ent-day nation states. However, if kingdoms passed away, it was obviously 
not the same to lose out to the successful “makers of the nation”, as Mercia to 
Wessex, than to alien conquerors. As Igor Santos Salazar pointed out in the 
debates at Salamanca, had Visigothic Spain succumbed to the Carolingians 
rather than to invading Muslims, historians’ visions of that episode would 
have surely been much less catastrophic. As it is, the scars of Islam’s pres-
ence and later disappearance from Iberia remain hard to integrate in popular 
narratives of the Spanish nation-state. A perfect contrast is provided by the 
Carolingian conquest of the Lombard kingdom, traditionally understood as 
the elimination of a not-very Catholic polity by the joint action of a Christian 
emperor and the Pope, as Gasparri criticizes in his paper. 
There is – understandably – no aim on the editor’s side to provide an ex-
haustive or balanced geographical coverage, which would demand an entire-
ly different kind of venture. The repertoire of cases considered concentrates 
upon southern Europe (Iberia and Italy), territories under Carolingian rule, 
and two excursions north (Mercia) and east (Great Moravia). Other regions 
could no doubt have been added, but the set is varied enough to address the 
main issues about the ending of early medieval polities. If at all, the one el-
ement I find missing is an explicit consideration of the ending of the Roman 
empire itself, arguably the clearest case of proper “collapse” available for this 
area and period3. To which extent the structural dismantling of the Roman 
empire resolved itself in the fifth century or continued into its successor king-
doms is a crucial aspect that could perhaps have enriched some of the ap-
proaches.
3 The most sophisticated approach to the structural analysis of Roman collapse is Wickham, 
Framing the Early Middle Ages.
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All papers deal with the endings of specific political constructs (we may 
choose to consider them “states” or not, just as the term “kingdom” may suit 
some cases better than others). To what extent those endings represent cas-
es of “collapse”? In Tainter’s formulation as a sudden fall in complexity – by 
far more sophisticated than Diamond’s environmental perspective – collapse 
is mainly a sociopolitical process, but of strongly structural nature4. It can 
be recognized in a drop in social differentiation and economic specialization 
(simpler labour division, less sophisticated material cultures, and lower tech-
nological thresholds), as well as a fall in centralized political control and a 
general loss of investment in complexity: monumentality, arts, sciences, tech-
nology, and so on. All of these factors can be identified archaeologically, even 
if their relative impact demands nuance. By contrast, it is political factors 
– aristocratic competition, dynastic relationships, military conquest – that 
seem to govern most of the processes studied in this volume. This is to a great 
extent a consequence of the sources employed, as made clear by the fact that 
the two papers that combine texts and archaeology (Martín Viso, Betti) are 
also the ones to bring in more explicitly issues of socioeconomic nature.
 The two essays on Iberia address the 711 Arab invasion from the comple-
mentary points of view of the kingdom’s political core – the royal court, the 
aristocracy, the high church – by Díaz Martínez and Poveda, and that of its 
northwestern periphery in Martín Viso’s paper. Likewise, West’s discussion of 
the ending of the Carolingian empire from the perspective of its intellectual 
core finds a counterpart in the same phenomenon as experienced in its Ital-
ian periphery (Albertoni), or even in a specific region thereof (Santos). Yet on 
different grounds, how much state formation in the peripheries owes to the 
influence of existing polities and how much the links between them may af-
fect the demise of the former is a matter for reflection when dealing with Mer-
cia (or even more with Alfred’s Wessex, which a long-standing historiography 
tends to present as being as complex as the Carolingian kingdom, only more 
efficient), or the Great Moravia, which can be seen as a periphery dramatically 
affected by pulses at the Carolingian core. 
2. Murder?
Several papers in this collection mark out military conquest as one of the 
most repeated causes for kingdoms to end. Conquest may happen not only in 
times of political instability, as in Visigothic Hispania, but also under per-
fectly “normal” conditions, as in Lombard Italy. It is the historical narratives 
that account for such defeats that tend to paint a gloomy picture of the losers, 
in an effort to rationalize/ moralize what is otherwise up to contingency. Not 
4 Tainter, The collapse; Diamond, Collapse. For details, see the presentation to this mono-
graphic section by Iñaki Martín Viso.
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all conquests are the same. In 711 the Visigothic and Arab armies were more 
or less even and any outcome could have been possible, whilst no process-
es of socioeconomic deterioration were drawing the Visigoths to perdition 
(Díaz Martínez and Poveda). “Murder” more than “collapse”, their kingdom 
was conquered rather than explode from within. The ensuing cultural shift 
was profound and the Visigothic ruling elites were either removed or had 
to reinvent themselves dramatically5. For central power that was an abrupt 
termination. However, the winners’ loot included, among other things, the 
main factor that had limited the development of power structures by their 
predecessors, namely, a highly fragmented territory with numerous regional 
elites whose engagement with both state and aristocracies was a permanent 
matter of negotiation. While the aristocratic edifice of the Visigothic kingdom 
perished, the transition might have been less traumatic for lesser-scale elites, 
especially in the areas where a reasonably healthy town-to-countryside rela-
tionship existed. 
There is much less ground for arguing that the Lombard kingdom could 
have resisted Frankish military might. Warfare-wise both parties were pretty 
unequal, but not that dissimilar culturally, despite the efforts deployed by the 
winners to depict the Lombards as pagan or nearly so. Gasparri’s rendering 
of the process shows that what was “murdered” in 774 was only an aristo-
cratic power structure that involved a very limited segment of society6. The 
territory was neither destroyed nor depopulated. Quite the opposite, it was 
incorporated into a much larger polity of greater structural complexity. In the 
absence of a cultural and religious breach like that of post-711 Iberia, adapta-
tion was much easier. Both significant segments of the Lombard aristocracy 
and medium-scale – mainly urban – elites played largely proactive roles in 
accepting and implementing the new situation. But, as in Iberia, the key issue 
in the Carolingian empire was how to keep a healthy flow of power between 
the center and the very diverse localities. Larger social distance to the center 
created more room for the exercise of delegate power and, thus, landscapes of 
opportunity, with the contradictory effects of reinforcing localities as the cap-
illary terminals of faraway rulership and, at the same time, promoting new 
sub-regional elites that could eventually take over if and when the center got 
into trouble, as Igor Santos discusses for Tuscany.
 Other kinds of military threat are addressed in some of the study-cases 
as external disruptions that can lead to the end of kingdoms. If central power 
fails to counteract raids, looting, killing and hostage- and tribute-taking, this 
can trigger all sorts of mechanisms of alienation. In societies where victory 
is strongly associated to God’s favour, how to account for defeat is a gigantic 
issue. It demands somebody to take the blame. As Charles West studies, the 
5 A recent reassessment in García Sanjuán, La conquista islámica.
6 See further Gasparri, Il regno longobardo in Italia and the essays collected in 774: Ipotesi su 
una transizione.
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laments of Abbo of Saint Germain about the crisis of the Carolingian kingdom 
take the Viking and – secondarily – the Hungarian raids as punishment for 
the sins of the Frankish elites. Francia was however too large and complex 
for raiders to entertain any prospect of conquest. They could instead deliver a 
lethal blow to smaller polities, especially if they eventually turned from plun-
dering to large-scale settlement, as in the Danelaw in Britain. However, both 
Insley and Betti make similar points in their articles that raids were not the 
only cause for Mercia or the Great Moravia to end. Much less so for territories 
under Carolingian rule. In fact, historians through the centuries have hesitat-
ed between considering alien raids as the trigger of collapse and seeing them 
as a stimulus that led rulers to enact defensive policies that in the long run 
prompted the development of statehood. Perhaps the best example of the lat-
ter case is Alfred the Great’s Wessex, in conjunction with the terminal phase 
of Mercia’s life as a kingdom. Insley is right to question such approaches and 
the same is valid for contemporary Francia.
3. Natural Causes?
Most essays in this special issue stress internal processes, mainly what 
could be called elites’ power relationships and networks. In short this comes 
down to three interrelated kinds of tension: within ruling dynasties, between 
kings and aristocrats and among the aristocracy. The level of detail that can 
be derived from the Italian massive preserved texts is in this respect truly 
amazing. Albertoni’s analysis of the ending of Carolingian rule in Italy shows 
particularly clearly that, even if elites composed very exclusive circles, their 
kin (let alone clientship) connections could be much denser than we can re-
construct for most early medieval situations. This is a fine reminder, too, that 
dynasties and the hereditary transmission of power are fluid constructs, more 
than hard rules, and ultimately the expression of certain levels of aristocratic 
consensus. Once a source of symbolic capital – to use Bourdieu’s terms – is 
established, the range of actors who can derive legitimacy from it may turn to 
be much broader than originally intended. This is well illustrated by the use 
of Carolingian ascendency by contenders for power in post-Carolingian Italy 
(Albertoni). However, the success associated to those strategies depends less 
on the force of a legitimacy that any contender can invoke than on having an 
audience sensitive to such claims.
Would it not be more realistic to reverse the agency flow and suggest 
instead that competing parties chose the candidates to support and echoed 
their discourses as part of their strategies for gaining positions within a given 
power structure? The statement of Archbishop Fulk of Reims, cited by West 
in his essay, that it was the custom of the Franks to choose their kings from 
the Carolingian dynasty, unmasks dynasties as the ultimate product of polit-
ical consensus. In most early medieval contexts, uncontested dynastic suc-
cession – at any rate relatively rare – has little to do with the strong institu-
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tional stability whose lack as has often been alleged as a structural weakness 
of the Visigothic monarchy. The Iberian aristocrats grouped up in parties, 
chose their leaders, backed candidates to the throne and deployed all sorts of 
strategies to put their man on it. They did not, however, reject the concept of 
a single monarch for all Hispania (Díaz Martínez and Poveda). That overall 
consensus set a framework for competition beyond which all players would 
lose out. Dynastic succession could be seen under this light like a way of lim-
iting the number of potential candidates, but the multiplication of would-be 
rulers of alleged Carolingian pedigree in the post-Carolingian world reminds 
that ideological resources never rested in one single actor’s hands. 
Neither did they have the last word. Several articles in the present collec-
tion discuss cases where aristocratic consensus was broken. The fact that the 
last ruler of the Mercians was a woman could – and did – foster arguments 
of political or military unsuitability, but Insley suggests that beneath her im-
prisonment by the king of Wessex underlay a change of allegiance on the side 
of the bulk of the Mercian aristocracy. The consensus that had formerly fueled 
the Mercian expansion and led it to incorporate a constellation of surround-
ing minor polities had vanished. Segments of the Mercian nobility opted for 
a larger-scale, militarily stronger kingdom, for which Wessex represented a 
better option, and they contributed to develop an all-encompassing identity 
in accordance, despite sporadic reappearances of a Mercian one in the written 
sources. Betti’s argument about the end of the Great Moravia is comparable. 
The death of Svatopluk gave way to a period of struggles among competing 
aristocrats that seems to have gone far beyond dynastic rivalry. In the pro-
cess, it was the great Moravian polity itself that exploded. The deeper reasons 
for the disruption of the former aristocratic consensus that had supported the 
principality can be, as Betti discusses, a combination of Hungarian attacks 
and the blockade of the Danube long-distance trade routes, but at some point 
the perception set in that respecting the existing political framework was no 
longer a red line. The ruler’s death did the rest. 
Of course, reminiscences of this process can be found too in territories 
under Carolingian rule. Could not one easily argue that the several phases in 
the division of Charlemagne’s realm dovetail nicely with the former territorial 
divisions of the Merovingian kingdoms and that unity is an oddity that calls 
for explanation more than the norm? Being the largest polity in the West, 
early medieval Francia seems to have always operated on both scales: the in-
dividual kingdoms and the kingdom of the Franks as a whole. The associated 
two-layered identities are explicit in Abbo of Saint Germain, as West carefully 
deconstructs in his essay. Operationally, the Frankish-wide scale seems to 
have only seldom superseded the others. Already in the seventh century, the 
aristocrats of Neustria and Burgundy chose Childeric II with the condition 
that each kingdom would keep its own traditions and appoint its own officers. 
In other words, that the state apparatus – thin as it could be – would remain 
a power resource at that scale. To what extent did the Carolingian expansion 
create a single, empire-wide aristocracy, committed to preserve that opera-
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tional scale? It rather seems that with the incorporation of more and more 
territories – Italy is a perfect case – the kingdom became increasingly “cre-
olized” and therefore more prone to fragmentation. Needless to say, though, 
that each of the Carolingian building blocks was more complex than the Great 
Moravia and that the socioeconomic foundations of their respective aristoc-
racies seem to have been very different too, so there are obvious limits to this 
comparison.
One remarkable effect of the development of modern states is that histori-
ans have long cherished the idea that pre-modern politics were dominated by 
a sort of zero-sum tension between the monarch (central power) and his no-
bility (selfish individuals with enough power to damage or even disintegrate 
the state if they felt their privileges were under threat). Among many other 
flaws, such an approach represents the state as a timeless organizational Deus 
ex machina that operates regardless of society. In doing so, it obscures the 
fact that states reflect the power relationships existing in society. The “king 
vs nobles” model is particularly inappropriate for the early middle ages, with 
their complex blend of reminiscences from Roman statehood, emergence of 
numerous non-state polities and start of state formation processes. Early me-
dieval polities – most of which boasted a legal and symbolic rhetoric that su-
perseded by far their actual achievement in terms of scope, reach, and effec-
tive governance – were mostly elite-driven constructs. They embedded power 
relationships to maintain social order (the foundations of social inequality) 
and they became states – “systems of durable inequality”, to borrow Charles 
Tilly’s formulation – inasmuch as they could develop an organizational appa-
ratus relatively independent from and longer-lived than individuals7. In the 
absence of more powerful drivers towards statehood, a minimum aristocratic 
consensus must be seen as the sine qua non condition for early medieval king-
doms to operate, and the breach of such a consensus a major force for their 
departure. 
An additional point can be made about the importance of political iden-
tities. West’s analysis of Abbo of Saint Germain’s notion of the kingdom of 
the Franks and his pessimistic view of its crisis represents the central power 
point of view, as is to be expected, especially among high ecclesiasts. Howev-
er, Carolingian identity was a resource that could be both enacted and re-cy-
cled in different contexts. It could be argued by peri- and post-Carolingian 
contestants to kingship. It could be employed in post-Carolingian Italy as a 
legitimating device, even if with no intention to revive Carolingian rule itself, 
as Albertoni indicates. Ties to Carolingian rulers could be employed by other 
foreign rulers with no direct participation in the Frankish political mainly to 
reinforce their internal position within their territories, as Svatopluk seems 
to have done in Moravia and, indeed, as Alfonso II did in the rising Asturi-
an kingdom. Similarly, the Mercian ideological U-turn that Insley discusses, 
7 Tilly, Identities, boundaries and social ties, pp. 71-90.
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appears to have been facilitated by the existence of a two-layered political 
identity that wrapped Mercian identity in a broader notion of Englishness. By 
identifying such an all-English consciousness with the kingdom of the West 
Saxons, the change of identity could be more smoothly effected. Instead, per-
ceptions from the peripheries of agonizing kingdoms need not follow exactly 
the same lines. Our sources definitely privilege central power and aristocratic 
views, but it would be narrow to assume that ordinary “local” people had only 
“local identities” and no conception of the world beyond and higher power. 
Hard as this is to investigate, the resurfacing of mentions of long-deceased 
kingdoms in later texts (Insley) could indicate that at least some layers of the 
former political articulation were embedded in local perceptions deep enough 
to be a part of their identities in the long term8. Maybe an extreme case is the 
Iberian Northwest studied by Martín Viso. A less developed periphery, first of 
the Roman Empire, then of the Visigothic kingdom, in the eighth century this 
large region seems to have got basically disconnected from any form of state 
organization. Martín Viso discusses in detail the archaeological expressions 
of such a disconnection, such as a loss in overall complexity and a wider range 
of operation for local peasant communities. However, complex cultural traits 
such as limited forms of literacy and a basic documentary and judicial culture 
persisted and were reproduced in local contexts, as recent work by Wendy 
Davies shows9. To what extent that locally rooted residual statehood paved 
the path for the incorporation of those regions to a large-scale kingdom in the 
late ninth and tenth centuries is a fascinating issue for future research. 
4. Strategies for Comparison
A more general realization that arises from reading this collection is that 
a full understanding of the topic cannot be reached within the narrow frame 
of the “period of collapse”. In my view, if kingdoms died, we must know how 
they lived. In other words, the endings of kingdoms cannot be separated from 
their formation and their structuration, as, for all their formal similarities, 
early medieval polities were extremely different from one another. General 
notions, such as “king”, “elites”, “aristocracy” or “Church”, mean very little if 
we do not bring into consideration which were the power resources effectively 
available to kings, which were the socioeconomic foundations of the aristo-
crats’ differentiation, or which – if any – were the capillary links that connect-
ed the higher political structures to the basic productive layers of society. As 
Kathleen Morrison has argued, what falls apart in a collapse are structures of 
inequality, and this is what early medieval kingdoms primarily were10. Con-
8 See Schwartz, From Collapse.
9 See, among others, Davies, Windows on Justice, Davies, Local Priests and the Writing of 
Charters, and Davies, Judges and judging.
10 Morrison, All is not lost when the center does not hold.
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sidering socio-economic factors beyond the vicious circle of economic mis-
management and environmental catastrophe not only brings into the picture 
the peasantry and the localities (both the material foundations of the higher 
elites and the limiters to their growth), but also puts flesh on the bones of 
structural political change. For example, a fundamental early medieval pro-
cess like the transformation of non-landed aristocracies into land-based ones 
and the creation of a structurally subaltern peasantry, as famously studied 
by Faith, is as much a sociopolitical process as an economic one and a major 
force underlying kingdom formation and termination in Anglo-Saxon Eng-
land11. It all comes down, therefore, to scrutinizing social complexity in itself, 
a theoretical stand which has the further advantage of being abstract enough 
to allow for both text-based and archaeological approaches to converge.
 Social complexity can be modeled by analyzing operational scale12. The 
importance of this issue is well illustrated in the present collection, where 
the scale of the units considered varies from the huge Carolingian construct 
to the much disarticulated Iberian North-West. The ending of the Lombard 
kingdom is particularly interesting in that it led not to fragmentation but 
to incorporation to much larger Carolingian territories and, conversely, the 
withdrawal of Carolingian rule in Italy meant a return to operational scales 
more in tune with the internal situation in the peninsula. Mercia’s ending re-
solved likewise in absorption into rising Wessex, while the Great Moravia ba-
sically fragmented and faded out. Changes in scale are particularly revealing 
of the underlying social processes. To what extent, for instance, one polity’s 
territorial expansion is a mere quantitative enlargement or involves structur-
al change? And, if the latter, which kind of change? The rapid expansion of the 
Great Moravia one generation before exploding looks like a case of mere “ag-
gregation”. Lesser units were added to a polity largely based upon direct links 
between the ruler and the respective dominant elites, with a minimum of di-
rect central agency. This tends to lead to structurally volatile aggregates that 
can easily explode, as it seems to have been the Moravian case13. On the oppo-
site end, the Carolingian expansion was based upon a massive investment in 
complexity. Rulers went a long way to secure direct central agency within the 
conquered territories, through a complex network of delegated offices, lead-
ing to much greater stability and local involvement in the functioning of the 
state as a whole. However this, in Tainter’s terms, also leads to decreasing 
benefits; greater and greater expenditure to preserve the state of things, and 
ultimately a failure to generate stable dependencies of the regional aristocra-
cies from the center. Time scale is an equally important factor14. Social actors 
11 Faith, The English Peasantry and the Growth of Lordship.
12 For details, see Escalona, The early Middle Ages: a scale-based approach. See also Con-
fronting scale.
13 See more generally Kristiansen, Chiefdoms, and a very comparable case in Davies, Patterns 
of power.
14 Gosden and Kirsanow, Timescales.
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are more likely to perceive, and respond to, processes that work at spatial and 
temporal scales that match their own experience. Abrupt political collapse 
is better noticed than gradual economic changes and not all actors have the 
same perceptional scales. While some of the kingdoms considered here had 
centuries-long existences (Visigothic Hispania), other units were strikingly 
ephemeral (Great Moravia), which reminds us that any consideration of po-
litical identities needs to combine long-term cultural transmission with the 
ephemerality of individual human experience. 
The essays in this special issue provide much food for thought. Individu-
ally they are all highly focused and provocative. Together they offer a fantastic 
material for comparison. This slightly random response does not intend to 
provide a sketchy rendering of them, much less so to “put them right” in any 
sense. It only expects to illustrate the huge potential that experiences as the 
Salamanca symposium they stem from have to trigger further thought and 
comparative reflections. Even if the collection can be seen as only scratching 
the surface of a topic that could well deserve a much more ambitious initia-
tive, like a large EU-funded project, there is hardly a better praise for it than 
to say that it certainly makes you want more of it.
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